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WHERE IS THE “QUALITY MOVEMENT” IN LAW 
PRACTICE? 
WILLIAM H. SIMON* 
 
   The “Quality Movement” that originated in industrial production 
and has since influenced the professions prescribes standardized work, root 
cause analysis of errors, peer review, and performance measurement.  
While these reforms have transformed medicine and some other 
professions, their influence has lagged in the legal profession.  This Essay 
reviews the limited progress of the reforms in law and assesses the cultural, 
institutional, and doctrinal obstacles they face. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The quality movement that transformed manufacturing in the mid-
twentieth century is having a profound influence on the professions 
these days.  The quest for “total quality” or “continuous 
improvement” is visibly reshaping basic norms and practices in 
engineering, social work, education, and medicine.1   
Law, however, has been substantially bypassed in this trend.  The 
market for legal services and the economic organization of law firms 
are vastly different from what they were a few decades ago.  But the 
 
         * Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University. 
 1. I use the term quality movement to embrace a convergent set of reforms 
that include “lean production” manufacturing and “evidence-based” social service 
practice.  E.g., JAMES P. WOMACK & DANIEL T. JONES, LEAN THINKING (1996); Bruce A. 
Thyer, What Is Evidence-Based Practice?, in FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE-BASED 
SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 35 (Albert R. Roberts & Kenneth R. Yeager eds., 2006). 
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production process is much less changed.  It tends to lack key features 
prescribed by the quality movement. The rhetoric associated with the 
quality movement is increasingly familiar to lawyers, and there have 
been some notable reform initiatives.  However, reforms seem to be 
more limited or more superficial in law than in other professions. 
The issues raised by the quality movement are fundamental.  Most 
obviously, they concern the cost and efficacy of service to clients.  
They also reach questions of the profession’s gatekeeper or 
compliance roles. As Donald Langevoort has explained, much 
corporate noncompliance arises less from calculated deviance than 
from cognitive and emotional disabilities.2  The quality movement 
suggests that the strength of these disabilities is not invariant but 
depends in part on organizational context, and the practices it 
recommends are designed to mitigate them.   
In addition, the quality movement raises important issues about 
pride and satisfaction in work.  As economic pressures increase, law 
practice is becoming more stressful and more regimented.  Lawyers 
may feel that their autonomy and opportunities for creativity are 
shrinking.  The quality movement has an important but ambiguous 
relation to these concerns.  The practical reforms associated with the 
movement tend to routinize practice and intensify monitoring of it.  In 
this sense, the movement might seem a threat to personal satisfaction 
in work, and certainly, many quality movement initiatives seem crassly 
materialistic and oppressively bureaucratic.3  But others are more 
ambitious.  In this more ambitious perspective, while the reforms limit 
individual autonomy, they enlist lawyers in a collective project of self-
assessment and institutional improvement that might prove personally 
satisfying.  In attempting to make work more transparent and 
adaptable, the reforms have the potential for making it more reflective 
and thus in a sense, more professional, than the informal and slow-to-
change structures they would replace.   
In Part I, I introduce the quality movement and discuss some 
indications that problems of the sort that it has responded to in other 
areas are present in the legal profession.  Part II describes the four 
main practical prescriptions of the movement—standardized work, root 
cause analysis of errors, peer review, and performance measurement.  I 
suggest that, while these practices have made some headway in the 
 
 2. E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House 
Lawyers, Enterprise Risk and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. xxx. 
 3. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk 
Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909 (2006) (arguing that some of the practices associated 
with the quality movement are in tension with professional ideals). 
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profession, all are less prominent than they are elsewhere, and two of 
them—root cause analysis and peer review—are barely visible.   
Part III briefly considers some of the obstacles to a more thorough 
embrace of quality reforms in law.  These obstacles are cultural, 
institutional, and doctrinal.  By and large, they seem the product of a 
conception of law practice that is out of date, and not just because of 
economic change.  The traditional doctrines of professionalism have 
assumed that lawyering tends to be both individual and ineffable.  The 
paradigmatic lawyer was the sole practitioner.  His work was 
considered impractical to observe, and except in egregious cases, to 
evaluate.  Thus, both law firms and regulators focused their efforts to 
insure quality on entry decisions—hiring for the firms and licensing for 
the regulators—rather than on direct and ongoing regulation of 
quality.  The premises of this approach are no longer true.  Lawyers 
increasingly practice in large organizations, and both within and across 
organizations, in teams.  There are norms and tools for the assessment 
of practice that are far richer than lawyers have traditionally used.  
Organizational clients have professional assistance that enables 
sophisticated observation and assessment of their lawyers.  The quality 
movement seems potentially a useful response to these developments. 
I. THE TURN TO QUALITY 
A milestone in the emergence of the quality movement in the 
professions was the 1991 Harvard study of hospital medical errors.  
Re-examining randomly selected cases from New York hospitals, the 
researchers found serious errors in nearly four percent.4  Later 
research produced even more striking findings.  “Studies have found 
that at least 30 percent of patients with stroke receive incomplete or 
inappropriate care from their doctors, as do 45 percent of patients with 
asthma and 60 percent of patients with pneumonia.”5  
Taking a cue from the manufacturing sector, the quality reformers 
in medicine argue that such studies indicate the need for organizational 
reform.  “New laboratory science is not the key to saving lives,” Atul 
Gawande writes.6   “The infant science of improving performance—of 
 
 4. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in 
Hospitalized Patients—Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 370, 370-71 (1991). 
 5. ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT 
10 (2009). 
 6. ATUL GAWANDE, BETTER: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON PERFORMANCE 242 
(2007). 
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implementing our existing know-how—is.”7  The fundamental principle 
of this infant science is what the Japanese automakers call kaizen—
continuous self-assessment and self-correction.  So far, its key 
organizational features seem to be standardized work, root cause 
analysis, peer review, and performance measurement. 
It is not possible to do a Harvard-type study of randomly selected 
cases for lawyering errors.  Yet, there is no reason to believe that, if 
such a study could be done, the results would be any less disturbing 
than those of the medical studies.  Both our general knowledge of 
organizational behavior and the occasional glimpses of the inner 
workings of law practice we get when things go visibly wrong suggest 
that errors occur routinely. 
A spectacular example is the indictment and conviction of Arthur 
Andersen on obstruction-of-justice charges arising from the 
destruction of Enron-related documents in 2001. (The conviction was 
later reversed on procedural grounds after the firm had ceased 
operating.)  One of the bases of the charges was a two-sentence e-
mail from an in-house Andersen lawyer in Chicago, sent shortly after 
Enron’s accounting manipulations became public and the SEC began 
investigating.  The e-mail suggested that the head of the Houston 
office “consider reminding” the Enron team of the firm’s document 
retention policy and enclosed the policy’s URL reference.8 
Prosecutors alleged that the lawyer intended to encourage mass 
shredding of Enron documents, which in fact occurred.  The lawyer 
asserted in her defense that she was only urging her colleagues to be 
“compliant” with the policy.9  Regardless of which interpretation is 
accepted, the story suggests significant deficiencies in the provision of 
legal advice to Andersen, and not just in the conduct of this one 
lawyer.  Even if we credit the lawyer’s testimony about her motives, 
sending a citation to a written policy without explanation is hardly an 
effective way to advise a client in a high-stakes sensitive situation.  
However, the quality movement warns that we should look beyond 
individual mistakes in situations like this.  In disasters of all kinds—
from airplane crashes to financial mismanagement—“human error” 
usually turns out to be the consequence of defective organizational 
structures and practices.   
At Andersen, the task of advising on a difficult question with 
momentous stakes was left, whether by design or inadvertence, to a 
 
 7. Id. at 242-43. 
 8. Destruction of Enron-Related Documents by Andersen Personnel: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 45 (2002). 
 9. Id. at 137-38. 
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single lawyer to perform on her own.  Apparently, Andersen and its 
lawyers had no written protocol for dealing with document issues when 
it learned that an investigation or proceeding had been initiated.  The 
general policy document transmitted with the e-mail, far from offering 
specific advice tailored to the situation, was a mass of ambiguities and 
contradictions.  (A third interpretation of the lawyer’s motivations—in 
addition to the prosecutor’s claim she was urging destruction and her 
own claim that she was urging compliance—is that she didn’t know 
what the right advice to give was because the written policy was 
incomprehensible.)  This was not a situation that was hard to 
anticipate.  Enron followed a series of high-profile financial disclosure 
scandals, including those arising from Waste Management and 
Sunbeam, that had entangled Andersen in many costly proceedings.  
Yet, Andersen’s lawyers failed to prepare it to respond effectively. 
A more extensive body of data implying lawyer error has emerged 
in connection with the investigations into the backdating of stock 
option grants at public companies.  The SEC has investigated more 
than a hundred companies, and more than eighty have restated 
earnings in connection with backdating concerns.  Using statistical 
modeling correlating stock prices with grant dates, economists Randall 
Heron and Erik Lie estimated that options were backdated or 
comparably manipulated at 29.2% of the 7,774 firms in their database 
between 1996 and 2005.10 
Although we don’t know much about particular circumstances, 
there are no plausible explanations of this phenomenon that do not 
involve widespread failures of lawyer judgment.  In a large fraction of 
cases, the executives who signed off on the grants did not benefit 
directly, and many, including Apple’s Steve Jobs, have said that they 
didn’t know that the backdating was illegal.  In virtually all cases, 
lawyers could have stopped the practice by admonishing the 
executives, or if necessary, the board.  No doubt the most common 
excuse is that the lawyers were unaware of the practice, but it seems 
likely that, for each of these firms, there was some lawyer (whether 
inside or outside) who should have known what was happening in this 
critical compliance area. 
II. QUALITY REFORMS AND LAW PRACTICE 
Recognizing that error occurs routinely even among highly 
qualified and respected practitioners led to quality movements in 
 
 10. Randall A. Heron & Erik Lie, What Fraction of Stock Option Grants to 
Top Executives Have Been Backdated or Manipulated?, 55 MGMT. SCI. 513, 514 
(2009). 
SIMON - PROOF II 4/4/2012  4:00:07 PM 
106 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
medicine and other professions.  Yet, there is no movement with that 
name in law.  True, there are some trends in law firm management that 
resonate with quality movement reforms.  There is a stronger emphasis 
on group practice and collaborative judgment than in the past.  Law 
firms usually have ethics committees and opinion committees, and 
these committees seem to have increasingly more authority.  In-house 
training programs are better configured to address issues that arise in 
practice.  A range of services rate law firms on the basis of client 
satisfaction reports.  Yet, such developments have been more modest 
than in other professions. 
The basic types of reform the quality movement prescribes are 
standardized work, systematic error detection, peer review, and 
performance measurement.  In the legal profession, quality rhetoric is 
usually associated with standardization and performance measurement, 
though the need and potential is at least as great for error detection 
and peer review. 
A. Standardized Work 
Quality reforms require the codification of work practices in 
detailed protocols or checklists.  It is useful to distinguish two types of 
norms found in such codifications. 
Some norms routinize practice either by dictating specific 
conduct, such as the angle that a nurse should hold a syringe in 
making an injection, or directing that the actor check that certain 
indicators are within an appropriate range, such as the instrument 
checks pilots do when preparing for take-off.  Other norms regulate 
the process of making decisions that may themselves be non-routine.  
When engineers develop new software products, they use a 
standardized development process, even as they produce non-standard 
products.  The surgery checklist that Gawande developed with the 
World Health Organization has both types of norms.  For example, a 
routinizing norm directs that a nurse do and report a sponge and 
instrument count.  A decision process norm prescribes, “Anesthesia 
team reviews [with surgery and nursing teams whether there] . . . are 
any patient-specific concerns.”11   
Formal experiment showed that the checklist improved practice, 
even though it was addressed to one of the most sophisticated 
contexts of professional endeavor.12  Protocols help, not only by 
 
 11. WORLD ALLIANCE FOR PATIENT SAFETY, SURGERY SAFETY CHECKLIST, 
(2008), available at http://www.who.int/patientsafety/safesurgery/ 
ss_checklist/en/; see GAWANDE, supra note 5, at 136-41. 
 12. See GAWANDE, supra note 5, at 142-57. 
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reminding practitioners of things they are prone to forget, but by 
inducing reflectiveness, communication, and transparency.  The 
function of rules in the new quality movement is different from their 
function in traditional bureaucracy.  Their primary goal is not to 
minimize discretion.  Indeed, often, the rules are not supposed to be 
followed if there’s a good reason to do otherwise (though the deviation 
and the reason for it must typically be documented).  Their key 
function is to facilitate change by making practice more self-conscious 
and transparent.  Formulating the rules requires that people reflect on 
what they do.  Following the rules allows them to compare their 
experiences.  “Only when you have standardization can you 
systematically improve your operations,” a manufacturing text 
advises.13  The process of measuring the relative efficacy of different 
practices requires that we be able to specify the practices that 
produced the outcomes. 
In law, checklists and other forms of standardization have long 
been associated with some tasks, such as “due diligence” in securities 
offerings, and more recently, venture capital financings.  Some lawyers 
have reported more ambitious efforts. The reports occasionally 
embrace the rhetoric and practices associated with the industrial 
quality movement.  The Association of Corporate Counsel has been a 
leader with its Value Challenge, which encourages and facilitates 
information about quality-oriented collaboration between in-house 
lawyers and outside counsel.14  A few law firms, including Seyfarth 
Shaw, and in-house legal staffs, including Dupont’s, have adopted the 
quality management methodology known as Six Sigma.  Some have 
even gone so far as to have themselves certified by one of the various 
organizations that train and assess Six Sigma skills. 15 
Although the accounts of these efforts are often vague, all of them 
seem to involve an effort to standardize work to facilitate continuous 
re-assessment and improvement.  Typically, the initiative begins by 
defining a set of client goals and then mapping and analyzing the 
associated legal services in an effort to trim waste and improve 
coordination. 
 
 13. PRODUCTIVITY PRESS DEV. TEAM, STANDARD WORK FOR THE SHOPFLOOR 10 
(2002). 
 14. ACC Value Challenge, ASS’N CORP. COUNS., http://www.acc.com/ 
valuechallenge/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 8, 2012). 
 15. Thomas L. Sager & Scott L. Winkelman, Six Sigma: Positioning for 
Competitive Advantage, 19 ACCA DOCKET 18 (2001) (in-house lawyer and outside 
counsel describing adoption of Six Sigma at Dupont); Elaine Schmidt, Law and Order: 
64-Year-Old Firm Adapts Six Sigma to the Delivery and Billing of Legal Services, ISIX 
SIGMA MAGAZINE, Nov.-Dec. 2009, at 26. 
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Nevertheless, insofar as one can estimate from available 
information, current standardization efforts appear limited in some 
respects.  First, they seem to be disproportionately focused on 
relatively simple and repetitive tasks that can be governed by 
routinizing norms and less attentive to relatively complex and 
differentiated tasks that call for decision process norms.  There is 
particular enthusiasm for standardization of tasks that can either be 
given to on-site paraprofessional staff or outsourced.  E-discovery has 
been subject to especially sophisticated standardization efforts.16  
Reformers also report efforts to standardize more complex but 
repetitive tasks such as employment litigation, intellectual property 
licensing, and environmental compliance.  They generally do not 
describe such efforts specifically enough to give a sense of what they 
involve. 
We hear little in these discussions about the standardization of 
the kind of decisions involved in the Andersen meltdown and the 
backdating scandals.  These are high-stakes decisions that cannot be 
routinized but that could benefit from protocols standardizing 
consultation, deliberation, and documentation.  I mentioned that the 
fateful in-house decision that led to the shredding of Enron documents 
was left to a single junior lawyer to make on her own with virtually no 
written guidance.  Backdating had many variations, including some 
involving deliberate wrongdoing.  But as Victor Fleischer has 
suggested, many seem to have involved inadequate administrative 
structures that left matters to ungoverned low-visibility decisions by 
solitary actors.17  Many managers claimed that their actions were 
approved by the auditors, although in most such instances it appears 
that the alleged approvals took the form of ambiguous oral statements 
rather than clear written ones.  Protocols of the sort that Gawande 
developed that combine routinizing and decision process norms would 
likely have helped avoid some of the failures that resulted. 
A second possible limitation suggested by some reports is that 
there is much more concern with cost-cutting than with quality 
improvement or practice innovation.  The reports frequently boast of 
dramatic and specific cost savings.  They rarely describe striking 
innovations.  It is possible that this imbalance reflects concerns that 
disclosure of practice innovations will lead to a loss of competitive 
advantage, but I doubt it.  Competitors share a good deal of technical 
information in most industries.  Lawyers do not seem to be an 
 
 16. KPMG, SIX SIGMA IN THE LEGAL DEPARTMENT: OBTAINING MEASURABLE 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS IN DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT (2006). 
 17. Victor Fleischer, Options Backdating, Tax Shelters, and Corporate 
Culture, 26 VA. TAX REV. 1031, 1045-52 (2007). 
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exception.  At bar association and continuing legal education sessions, 
lawyers are constantly telling their peers how they accomplish their 
successes.  They may do this in the hope that others will reciprocate 
to their benefit.  Or they may do this because it is the only credible 
way to demonstrate their superior expertise and thus obtain the 
prestige and referrals that it attracts.18  Thus, it seems revealing that, 
so far, the quality literature has more to say about cost than about 
quality. 
Third, the reports are ambiguous about the effect of quality 
undertakings on hierarchy.  Standardization can be a way of enlisting 
all workers in re-assessment and innovation, or it can be a way of 
imposing hierarchical judgments on lower-status workers.19  Some of 
the legal reports have a technocratic flavor that suggests the latter.  
Of course, hierarchy may be the most efficient way to organize some 
kinds of work.  But to the extent that we are interested in the 
potential of the quality movement to vindicate the aspirations of 
traditional professionalism for meaningful work, the more bureaucratic 
forms of standardization have a cost.   
B. Root Cause Analysis 
A key premise of the quality movement is that mistakes are 
learning opportunities.  Since mistakes are usually consequences of 
structures and processes, analyzing mistakes diagnostically can reveal 
potential institutional improvements. 
Japanese auto manufacturing prescribes that mistakes be 
addressed in terms of the “5 Whys.”  For example, the immediate 
problem is that a machine is malfunctioning, but when we trace back 
the root cause, we find that the malfunction occurred because the 
worker failed to maintain it properly, that he failed to maintain it 
properly because he was pre-occupied with another machine that kept 
jamming, and that the second machine jammed because of a design 
defect in the part that it stamped.  The most useful intervention is to 
re-design the part, but we never learn that if we stop at the “human 
error” of the maintenance worker. 
 
 18. ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION 77-91 (2005) (explaining 
why innovators often freely reveal their innovations). 
 19. For an example of the egalitarian version, see MICHEL GREIF, THE VISUAL 
FACTORY: BUILDING PARTICIPATION THROUGH SHARED INFORMATION 213 (1989) (“By 
decentralizing and providing management tools at the production location [i.e., 
practice standards and performance indicators], management has in effect expanded 
the number of managers.”). 
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Mention of error detection and root cause analysis is rare in the 
legal literature on quality management.  An interesting exception in a 
discussion by KPMG of how Six Sigma might be applied to e-discovery 
gives an example of the 5 Whys applied to errors in decisions as to 
whether material is privileged: 
Why #1: Why are there too many defects related to privilege 
calls and redactions? 
Answer: The review team may not have case specifics. 
Why #2: Why doesn’t the review team have the case-specific 
information necessary to make accurate privilege calls and 
redactions? 
Answer: The review team does not have a list of all custodian 
and counsel names to track attorney-client communication 
that could potentially be privileged or require redaction. 
Why #3: What custodian names and counsel names pertain to 
this matter? 
Answer: A list of 20 custodian and 5 counsel names was 
provided to the review team. 
Why #4: It the list accurate? What about the surrounding 
privilege and confidential issues related to Joe Smith and 
Kelli Jones? 
Answer: We don’t see Joe Smith or Kelli Jones on this list of 
custodian or counsel names. This could be a root cause!20 
Most of the legal quality literature is silent on error detection and 
correction.  This is particularly surprising with respect to Six Sigma 
partisans, since the term Six Sigma refers to a mathematical ratio 
(three per million) proposed in the industrial engineering literature to 
designate an acceptable error rate.21  This particular standard is 
arbitrary even in the manufacturing context, and there is no reason to 
think that it has any application to law practice.  Yet, the legal 
literature does not discuss how errors are addressed or what are 
acceptable tolerances. 
While KPMG’s effort to apply Six Sigma to law practice is thus 
innovative, the example quoted above is inept in a symptomatic way.  
The analysis treats as four separate stages what is really a single 
cause—the review team lacks a complete counsel/custodian list.  More 
importantly, it appears to stop prematurely.  There is no canonical way 
to define what constitutes a single “Why”, and “5” is an illustrative 
number, rather than a requirement.  The basic goal is to trace back 
 
 20. KPMG, supra note 16, at 16-17. 
 21. Sager & Winkelman, supra note 15, at 18. 
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the problem as far as is likely to be productive.  Yet, in KPMG’s 
example, it seems likely that it would be worthwhile to go another step 
or two.  Why doesn’t the review team have a complete list?  Is it 
because the list was compiled or taken from some separate source that 
has inaccuracies?  (If so, the remedy should extend to that source.)  Is 
it because the team does not include people who have access or the 
ability to interpret essential information.  (If so, the team or its lines of 
communication should be re-configured.) 
One could imagine that KPMG’s truncated analysis might lead to 
the conclusion that whoever failed to give the team a complete list 
should be blamed and disciplined.  Such a conclusion would be 
contrary to the spirit of root cause analysis, which is intended to 
counter the tendency among both regulators and companies to 
individualize responsibility.  The danger of this tendency is that it may 
discourage the systemic perspective.  The SEC has disciplined a few 
lawyers, including Apple’s General Counsel, in connection with 
backdating, but, understandably, it has prioritized cases of intentional 
wrongdoing, especially for direct personal gain, and has thus focused 
on individual motivation, rather than defective structures and 
processes.  Law firms appear spontaneously inclined to take the 
individual perspective.  When they are caught in a scandal, they often 
look for individual wrongdoers and respond by disciplining or firing 
them.22  A consultant for liability insurers tells me that, when he visits 
a firm where serious professional failure has occurred, the most 
common response he hears is, “We had a problem, but we got rid of 
him.”   
Firms understandably seek to minimize publicity around scandals; 
so we have limited information of how they respond to the discovery of 
high-stakes errors.  But as far as we know, they tend not to respond 
with structural re-assessment and reform.  There is no indication that 
any of the firms or in-house staffs implicated in the backdating cases 
responded with anything resembling root cause analysis. 
C.  Peer Review 
Gawande and others have pointed to the Mayo Clinic and Western 
Medical Associates in Grand Junction, Colorado, as a kind of 
healthcare “gold standard” that combines effective treatment with low 
costs.  One of the key distinguishing features of these organizations is 
 
 22. An example is Milbank Tweed’s response to the perjury prosecution of 
one of its bankruptcy partners. MILTON C. REGAN, EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A 
WALL STREET LAWYER  229-31 (2006). 
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strong peer review.23  Peer review enlists social pressures of shame and 
honor in favor of good performance, and it facilitates sharing of 
information.  It also encourages the professionals being reviewed to be 
more reflective and articulate about their practice. 
Peer review takes many forms, but in medicine, the most 
demanding and rewarding form is the case analysis in which the 
treatment of a particular patient or group of patients is critically 
appraised by a group of colleagues.  This is the type of review that 
most directly and richly engages professional skills.  Legislatures, 
licensing authorities, hospital accreditation bodies, and third-party 
payers require a range of case-focused peer review processes.  For 
example, hospital “mortality reviews” assess the treatment of patients 
who die in the hospital.  The focus is on errors or sub-optimal care.  
The treating doctors explain what they did and receive critical 
feedback from peers.  Hospitals are supposed to engage in routine peer 
review of staff and attending physicians.  The review includes scrutiny 
of a sample of the physician’s cases.  And third-party payers routinely 
undertake “utilization reviews” that assess the medical necessity of 
the treatment provided.24 
As the quality movement has advanced in education and social 
work, such review has become more common in those fields.  Kathleen 
Noonan, Charles Sabel, and I recently described an impressive peer 
review process performed in the child protective service agencies of 
several states.  The process involved an audit of selected cases by 
teams consisting of supervisors and social workers from other states’ 
systems.25  Not all peer review processes have powerful effects; some 
are empty formalities or occasions for casual socializing.  I would put 
the peer review process I know best—the one associated with law 
school accreditation—somewhere between the poles of high efficacy 
and triviality.  In my experience, the schools occasionally get valuable 
ideas from the peer critics, but not often.  However, the process of 
self-assessment that occurs in preparation for the peer sessions is 
usually valuable. 
Peer review is strikingly underdeveloped in law.  In law schools, 
legal scholarship is notoriously divorced from practice, and clinical 
 
 23. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, 
available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande. 
 24. ROBERT J. MARDER ET AL., EFFECTIVE PEER REVIEW (2d ed. 2007); 
PRATHIBHA VARKEY, MEDICAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 2009). 
 25. Kathleen Noonan, Charles Sabel & William H. Simon, Legal 
Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare 
Reform, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523 (2009). 
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teachers have never developed the art of the case presentation.  The 
most common type of peer exchange among practitioners is 
“continuing legal education,” which even at its best, tends to take the 
form of general lectures and discussions only occasionally and vaguely 
focused on lawyering.  CLE lecturers have an unfortunate tendency to 
model their pedagogy on that of the law schools.  They are thus much 
more likely to talk about recent appellate decisions than about how 
they organize their practices or how they respond to recurring 
practical issues where statutes and cases provide little guidance. 
Within firms, ongoing practice takes place increasingly in groups 
or teams that involve peer exchange over current decisions.  But as I 
noted in connection with root cause analysis, there does not appear to 
be any developed practice even within firms of critical retrospective 
assessment of past decisions. 
Outside counsel rating systems aggregate impressionistic 
judgments by clients about their lawyers, sometimes in a very 
sophisticated way.  The resulting rankings can be informative, but they 
do not involve the kind of focused deliberative exchange of the more 
developed peer review systems.  The client judgments that are 
aggregated are not made in a structured group process, and they are 
not focused on specific cases and practices.  Thus, they do not 
produce the diagnostic learning that peer review aims at. 
However, there appear to be some more ambitious exceptions.  
For example, FMC Technologies engages in “After Action Reviews” of 
completed matters.  The review involves intense discussion of the 
question, “How could the matter have been handled better 
(procedurally)?”  The process focuses on “continuous improvement as 
opposed to dwelling on the past.”26 
Recent regulatory reform in New South Wales, Australia, carries 
the peer review idea much farther than American requirements.  Firms 
who adopt the Incorporated Legal Practice (ILP) form must have 
“appropriate management systems.”27  The Office of the Legal Services 
Commissioner audits periodically (and with greater frequency for firms 
considered high-risk) to assess compliance, and it provides technical 
assistance to regulated firms.  The assistance takes the form, not just 
of general lectures, but advice tailored to the circumstances of 
 
 26. Value Practice: Focus on After Action Review as a Way of Adding Value, 
ASS’N CORP. COUNS., http://www.acc.com/advocacy/valuechallenge/toolkit/ 
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageid=40522 (last visited Mar. 8, 2012). 
 27. Christine Parker et al., Regulating Law Firm Ethics Management: An 
Empirical Assessment of an Innovation in Regulation of the Legal Profession in New 
South Wales, 37 J.L. SOC’Y 466, 471 (2010). 
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particular firms.28  This type of oversight and advice is sometimes 
provided to American firms from liability insurers, but many U.S. 
lawyers, probably including most of those who need it most, do not 
receive it. 
Such practices are potentially valuable, but from the perspective 
of the quality movement, they suffer from an important limitation: They 
are confined to matters of “structure and process” and do not 
scrutinize judgments in specific cases.   
D. Performance Measurement 
Of the four categories of quality-related endeavor, performance 
measurement is the most familiar and developed in law offices.  Firms 
use business metrics, such as hours billed in relation to hours worked, 
revenues in relation to billings (realization rates), and profits.  They 
aggregate supervisor, peer, and client judgments of the quality of work 
and of results.  Such judgments may be made for individual lawyers, 
practice groups, or the firm as a whole.  Firms use such judgments for 
promotion, compensation, and training decisions.  Business clients use 
them to decide how to allocate their work. 
While such metrics and judgments are necessary for efficient 
personnel and procurement decisions, they do not necessarily address 
quality in the strong sense that the quality movement prescribes.  An 
ambitious quality effort strives, not just to reward quality, but to 
improve it.  For that purpose, we need metrics that have diagnostic 
value.  Declining profits or client retention may tell the firm that it is 
doing something wrong, but such metrics do not give it any indication 
what that something is.  More specific metrics may be more helpful, 
but of course, specific metrics can be ambiguous or misleading.  In a 
hospital, a high mortality rate for cardiac surgery might indicate a 
quality problem with the surgical team, but it might also indicate that 
the hospital has frailer patients.  When regulators forced hospitals to 
publish raw mortality data, some surgeons reportedly responded by 
trying to avoid vulnerable patients.  The regulators’ response was to 
adjust the data with an algorithm designed to account for the relative 
vulnerability of patients.  But such complex metrics are costly to 
develop and apply, and some kinds of professional practice are not 
measurable in this way.29 
 
 28. Id. at 471-74. 
 29. David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies, 25 
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 173-74 (2006). 
SIMON - PROOF II 4/4/2012  4:00:07 PM 
201X:N Quality Movement in Law 115 
In the legal profession, government lawyers appear to have done 
the most sophisticated thinking so far on diagnostic measures.30  Many 
prosecutors’ offices have focused on conviction rates (including pleas).  
But a single-minded focus on this metric can encourage over-charging 
(so as to generate pressure to plead to a lesser offense), not to 
mention unethically aggressive behavior.  The newer techniques take 
account of whether convictions were to the offenses charged or to 
lesser offenses, and treat high fractions of pleas to lesser charges as 
signals of possible over-charging.  They also score measures of 
timeliness, consistency of charging decisions, and reported victim and 
witness satisfaction with their treatment.  Some measures are related 
to particular local strategies.  An office adopting a “broken windows” 
policing strategy might measure convictions for specified “quality of 
life” offenses.  Another experimenting with a drug treatment diversion 
program might measure the fraction of certain categories of cases 
diverted.  Metrics may include estimates of occurrence of specified 
crimes in the relevant community. 
From a diagnostic point of view, it is useful to distinguish practice 
or process metrics from outcome metrics.  The practice metrics 
measure the extent to which the lawyers are complying with their 
standardized work norms.  The fraction of cases meeting the relevant 
criteria that are diverted to a treatment program would be an example.  
Outcome measures report on the extent to which goals are being 
achieved.  Recidivism rates among arrestees in the diversion categories 
would be an example.  The practice metrics indicate the extent to 
which the program is being implemented.  The outcome metrics give 
some indication of the extent to which it is accomplishing its goals.31 
Of course, the interpretation of such measurements is complex 
and speculative.  The causal relation between practice (diversion) and 
outcome (recidivism) will usually be speculative.  A low outcome score 
could indicate that the practice was misconceived, but it could also 
mean that the outcome measure is inadequate.  Note, however, that 
for diagnostic purposes, progress does not necessarily require 
statistical rigor.  Analysis can detect remediable errors and produce 
learning even if it does not produce uncontroversial generalizations of 
the sort that would support sanctions and rewards.  Moreover, even 
 
 30. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-422, U.S. ATTORNEYS: 
PERFORMANCE-BASED INITIATIVES ARE EVOLVING (2004); see also M. ELAINE NUGENT-
BOROKOVE ET AL., NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N & AM. PROSECUTORS RESEARCH INST., 
EXPLORING THE FEASIBILITY AND EFFICACY OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES IN PROSECUTION 
AND THEIR APPLICATION TO COMMUNITY PROSECUTION (2009). 
 31. See ROBERT S. KAPLAN & DAVID P. NORTON, THE BALANCED SCORECARD: 
TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO ACTION 147-55 (1996). 
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speculative data can usefully direct attention fruitfully and structure 
discussion.  It would usually not be fair to blame or sanction 
prosecutors for increasing crime rates, given the many factors beyond 
their control that affect crime.  But it is still useful for the prosecutors 
to examine crime rate data and consider what it might suggest about 
the efficacy of their practices. 
Some performance measures, such as conviction rates, are based 
on readily available numbers.  Others, however, require complex 
judgment.  The performance assessment instrument for social workers 
that colleagues and I studied included scores for qualitative 
assessments of such matters as the adequacy of planning and services 
for the child in a given case.  Experience showed that, as long as 
examiners discussed their views with each other when they were 
unsure, judgments tended to be consistent.  Social scientists have 
techniques for establishing “inter-rater reliability” for qualitative 
judgments.  The techniques are often costly and time-consuming, but 
consistency is not necessarily precluded by the qualitative nature of 
the relevant judgments. 
To judge by public discussions, the quality efforts in private firms 
have not begun to exploit the diagnostic and learning potential of 
performance measurement to the extent that lawyers in the public 
sphere and practitioners in other fields have done. 
III. OBSTACLES TO QUALITY EFFORTS IN LAW PRACTICE 
Several distinctive conditions may explain the relatively slow 
progress of quality initiatives in the legal profession.  None seem 
insuperable, but some may require institutional reforms before 
significant progress can be made. 
A. Professional Culture 
A few years ago the director of a legal services program explained 
to me the process by which the program evaluated its lawyers.  For 
each lawyer, evaluators interviewed peer and staff colleagues on their 
views of the lawyer’s strengths and weaknesses and contacted a sample 
of the lawyer’s clients to get their views of the quality of the 
representation they received.  When I asked whether the evaluation 
involved a peer review of a sample of the lawyer’s cases, the director 
said no and expressed surprise.  “These people are professionals,” he 
said.  “They don’t expect others to be second-guessing their 
judgments.” 
The notion of professionalism implicit in the director’s response is 
long-standing.  In this view, lawyers practice on their own.  They are 
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not subject to close supervision.  Their judgments tend to be tacit and 
ineffable.  Their decisions cannot be assessed by lay people, and even 
among peers, distinctions between good and bad practice can only be 
made in extreme situations. 
In this view, the solitary and ineffable nature of professional work 
was portrayed as a necessity, but it also came to be seen as a 
prerogative.  The profession attracted people who liked to work on 
their own and disliked supervision.  Part of the prestige and dignity of 
the professions was tied to these conditions.  Thus, it is not surprising 
to find professionals resisting the pressures for standardized work or 
performance measurement of the sort promoted by the quality 
movement. 
Professional ideology tends to view the lawyers “independence” 
(or isolation) as a safeguard of the client’s interests, and to see almost 
any efforts at organizational accountability as presenting threats to 
client interests.  After abandoning its more categorical opposition, the 
bar continues to mount ambiguous resistance to efforts by insurance 
companies and legal aid programs to exert organizational control over 
the lawyers they compensate on behalf of third-party clients.  They 
often oppose supervision as inconsistent with the lawyer’s duty to 
reject “interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional 
judgment.”32 
To an important extent, such views seem anachronistic.  Lawyers, 
like most professionals, now practice for the most part in large 
organizations.  They tend to do their work in groups.  These groups 
are often interdisciplinary.  In addition to inducing reflection, 
standardization facilitates communication across disciplines. 
The legal aid director with whom I discussed staff evaluation 
assumed that the major satisfactions of professional work were 
connected to freedom from supervision.  It’s true that supervision can 
be oppressive.  However, the newer style of professional work is more 
collaborative than the traditional one, and many people will find this 
collaborative dimension more satisfying.  Moreover, the newer style 
potentially increases the experience of self-conscious learning and 
innovation. 
Organizational control can threaten client interests, but a key 
lesson of the quality movement is that it is also potentially a safeguard 
of them.  Error studies show that solitary ineffable professional 
 
 32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f)(2) (2011); see, e.g., ABA  
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Lawyers Participation in For-Profit Prepaid 
Legal Service Plan, Formal Op. 87-355 (1987) (suggesting that almost any supervision 
by provider of prepaid legal insurance of lawyers’ activities has “a potential for 
improper control” under this rule). 
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judgment often produces errors that can be avoided by institutional 
controls.  Although we don’t have comparable studies for lawyers, 
there is no reason to think that lawyers are immune from the cognitive 
limitations that quality reforms are designed to correct.  The bar’s 
preoccupation with independence needs to be tempered with a 
recognition that too much independence is at least as dangerous as too 
little.33 
B. Economic Context 
The quality movement came to medicine only after third-party 
payment became the dominant manner of compensation for medical 
services.  It came at the insistence of the third-party payors—the 
insurers and the government.  In law, we also see insurers and the 
government as salient movers behind quality initiatives, but in contrast 
to medicine, third party payors account for a small fraction of the 
market.  Most legal bills are paid by clients.   
We might expect clients to push quality reforms, and as I’ve 
noted, we do to some extent.  Client efforts vary, however, depending 
on whether they are government actors, businesses, or individuals. 
We’ve seen that, among clients, government agencies have 
undertaken the most sophisticated efforts to reform the practices of 
the lawyers who work for them.  Businesses with large legal bills have 
also been active, but their efforts appear not to have been as energetic 
or creative as those of public-sector actors.  A possible distinction has 
to do with the relative duration and breadth of the lawyer-client 
relations.  Government agencies and their lawyers have a long-term 
and encompassing relation.  Business lawyers and their clients 
sometimes have such relations but more often do not.  The deeper and 
longer the relation, the more it makes sense to make the kinds of 
relational investments required for quality processes.  The most 
 
 33. A major step in this direction is Model Rule 5.1, which mandates that law 
firm partners make efforts to ensure that “the firm has in effect [reasonable] 
measures” to ensure compliance with their ethical obligations. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2011). Prior to that rule, professional responsibility doctrine 
treated lawyers as solitary individuals concerned only with their own conduct.  See 
Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4-6 
(1991); see also Parker et al., supra note 27, at 493, 499 (reporting that client 
complaints appear to have declined in Australian firms subject to rules mandating 
organizational controls, relative to firms not subject to the rules). 
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ambitious quality initiatives in the private sector seem associated with 
relational contracting.34 
If government clients seem to be taking care of their interests in 
quality and business clients at least have the capacity to do so, that 
leaves individual clients, particularly one-shot unsophisticated clients, 
uncovered.  The malpractice action is designed to protect them, but it 
is a crude and expensive method of quality control.  The medical error 
studies indicate that only a small fraction of even serious errors 
eventuate in tort claims.35  Preventive regulation seems desirable.  As 
long as the organized profession exercises predominant control over 
the regulatory process, prevention-oriented reform will be difficult, but 
the Australian example shows that significant progress is possible in 
some circumstances. 
Another pertinent economic circumstance that differentiates 
lawyers from doctors and some other professions is that lawyers 
operate in a more competitive environment.  Competitive concerns 
would inhibit peer review and transparency initiatives.  Lawyers would 
not willingly participate in a process that might disclose weaknesses in 
their practices to competitors who could use the information to solicit 
their clients.  This obstacle is daunting but not insuperable.  Insurers, 
regulators, and bar associations could construct a review process that 
minimized the risk of subjecting practitioners to review by competitors.  
Retired lawyers and judges might be good candidates for reviewers.   
C. Confidentiality 
Error detection and peer review raise two types of confidentiality 
concerns.  First, there is the question of whether quality assessment 
information should be fully available to the client whose representation 
is being assessed.  The disclosure of errors could lead to malpractice 
claims.  Disclosure will sometimes be in the firm’s self-interest.  If the 
client is likely to discover the error anyway, it is better for the firm 
that the client learns from the firm itself.  And disclosure will 
sometimes enable lawyer and client to take actions to mitigate the 
effects of the error.  But no doubt there are some situations involving 
errors that are large, unlikely to be discovered in the absence of 
 
 34. David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate 
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 35. A. Russell Localio et al., Relation between Malpractice Claims and 
Adverse Events Due to Negligence—Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 
325 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 245, 248-49 (1991) (estimating on basis of extensive empirical 
study that less than one in seven medical errors eventuate in malpractice claims). 
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disclosure, and irremediable where disclosure would be strongly against 
the firm’s interest.  Moreover, even where review does not disclose 
substantial errors, critical comments by reviewers, if disclosed, might 
undermine client confidence.  Lawyers fearing such consequences 
would be reluctant to engage in review or to assess candidly. 
It seems incompatible with fiduciary commitment to the client to 
exempt the lawyer from responsibility to disclose substantial errors, 
however painful that duty may become.36  However, since that duty 
may inhibit quality efforts, some regulatory pressure—for example, 
mandated review processes and strong penalties for breach of 
disclosure duties37—may be necessary in some practice contexts, 
especially those involving unsophisticated clients.  On the other hand, 
while the client’s interest in learning about errors seems large, her 
interest in learning critical comments made in review processes seems 
much weaker.  Here the case for a “privilege of self-critical analysis” 
and corresponding exemption from ethical disclosure duties seems 
plausible.  Statutes provide some protections of this kind in the 
medical peer review context, and some states have enacted a “self-
audit” privilege for insurance companies.38 
The other set of confidentiality issues concerns the possibility 
that review might inadvertently waive client confidentiality vis-à-vis 
outsiders.  Any peer review involving outsiders to the firm would 
require client consent, and there is a risk that such consent might be 
construed as a waiver of privilege with respect to the world at large, 
rather than just with respect to reviewers.39  Again, the problem could 
be solved at little cost with an explicit exception from waiver doctrine 
for disclosures in connection with good faith peer review and quality 
control efforts.   
 
 36. Benjamin P. Cooper, The Lawyer’s Duty to Inform His Client of His Own 
Malpractice, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 174, 175-79, 213-14 (2009). 
 37. An optimal sanction regime should generally set higher penalties for 
undisclosed than for disclosed malpractice. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier 
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability 
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). 
 38. Marder et al., supra note 24, at 21-24; Christine A. Edwards & John E. 
Court, Good Corporate Behavior Redux—The Federal Self-Evaluative Privilege, 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., June 2007, at 13, available at 
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/publications/GoodCorporateBehaviorRedux.pdf; 
see also Brendan F. Quigley, The Need to Know: Law Firm Internal Investigations and 
the Intra-Firm Dissemination of Privileged Communications, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
889 (2007) (discussing the extent to which lawyers can assert privilege against clients 
for intra-firm discussion of their responsibilities to the clients). 
 39. See, e.g., In Re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1987) (client’s consent 
to lawyer’s disclosure can waive privilege beyond scope of intended disclosure). 
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The confidentiality obstacles to the more ambitious quality efforts 
are substantial as doctrine now stands.  But it seems likely that the 
bar could obtain legislative changes that would resolve the problems if 
it had the inclination to do seek them. 
 CONCLUSION 
Despite some notable initiatives and the increasing use of quality 
rhetoric, the bar has lagged in the embrace of the quality reforms that 
have transformed other professions.  The inhibitions on reform protect 
clients and lawyers from the dangers that reform might compromise 
client interests or lawyer morale, but they also preclude the benign 
potential of reform, including the fostering of service that is more 
reflective, adaptive, and transparent to clients.   
  
 
